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 All Those Arrows 
Donald MacKenzie 
• Fool’s Gold: How Unrestrained Greed Corrupted a Dream, Shattered Global 
Markets and Unleashed a Catastrophe by Gillian Tett 
Little, Brown, 338 pp, £18.99, April 2009, ISBN 978 1 4087 0164 5 
Few people’s reputations have been improved by the credit crisis. One is the BBC’s Robert 
Peston; another is Vince Cable. A third is Gillian Tett, capital markets editor of the Financial 
Times. Prior to the crisis, she and her team were the only mainstream journalists who covered 
in any detail the arcane world of ‘credit derivatives’. Tett saw – however imperfectly – the 
huge risks that were accumulating unnoticed within that world, and spoke out about them. 
Fool’s Gold begins in a conference room in Nice in spring 2005. Tett admits that at that point 
she was baffled by the technical language – ‘Gaussian copula’, ‘attachment point’, ‘delta 
hedging’ – used by the participants. However, before joining the FT she had conducted 
fieldwork in Soviet Tajikistan for a PhD in social anthropology, and the ethnographer in her 
was now reawakened. The conference reminded her of a Tajik wedding. Those attending it 
were forging social links and celebrating a tacit world-view – in this case, one in which ‘it 
was perfectly valid to discuss money in abstract, mathematical, ultra-complex terms, without 
any reference to tangible human beings.’ 
She whispered to the man sitting beside her, asking who the key actors in the ceremony were 
– those up on the conference hall’s stage. ‘They used to all work at J.P. Morgan,’ he 
answered. ‘It’s like this Morgan mafia thing. They sort of created the credit derivatives 
market.’ The answer surprised her. J.P. Morgan was not Goldman Sachs; it wasn’t an exciting 
bank. It bore the name of America’s most celebrated financier, but it was ‘dull’: safe, boring, 
perhaps a little snobbish. (When its current chief executive, the now well-respected Jamie 
Dimon, joined the bank from Bank One, whose headquarters were in Chicago, Tett reports 
that one Morgan banker muttered: ‘Not another retail banker from Hicksville, USA!’) 
The core of Tett’s book, which is by far the most insightful of the first wave of books on the 
crisis, is the story of J.P. Morgan’s credit derivatives team. For all the bank’s traditionalism – 
the door staff at its London offices wouldn’t look out of place outside the Ritz – it was quietly 
innovative. One of the team’s driving forces was a young Englishwoman, Blythe Masters; 
another, Terri Duhon, makes no secret of her upbringing in a trailer in Louisiana; central to 
its technical work was an Indian mathematician, Krishna Varikooty. Boisterousness that 
would have horrified John Pierpont Morgan was tolerated. At one gathering in Florida, one of 
the team’s managers broke his nose when drunken colleagues were pushing him into a hotel 
swimming-pool. 
The team’s pivotal innovation, introduced in December 1997, was a deal they called ‘Bistro’ 
(Broad Index Secured Trust Offering). For a decade, banks had been experimenting with 
credit derivatives, which are ways of separating out the ‘credit risk’ involved in lending (the 
risk that borrowers will default on their obligations, failing to make the required interest 
payments or not repaying their loans) and turning that risk into a product that can be bought 
and sold. Bistro helped make this tentative activity big business: it transferred to outside 
parties the credit risk of loans totalling $9.7 billion that J.P. Morgan had made to 307 
companies. The scheme was an influential version of a CDO (collateralised debt obligation), 
and like other CDOs, Bistro was divided into ‘tranches’, of which originally there were two. 
Investors in the lower or ‘junior’ tranche received a healthy rate of return, 375 basis points 
over Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate), which is the average rate at which a panel of 
leading banks report they can borrow from other banks.[*] (A basis point is a hundredth of a 
percentage point.) This compensated the junior investors for the fact that their investments 
would bear the initial losses, beyond a small reserve built up during the deal’s first five years, 
should any of the 307 borrowers default. 
Only if those losses were to exceed the entirety of the investments in the junior tranche would 
the holders of Bistro’s senior tranche – which paid only 60 basis points over Libor – suffer. 
The loans that made up Bistro were well diversified across industries, and were made 
predominantly to blue-chip companies, so losses to Bistro’s senior tranche seemed unlikely 
enough for Moody’s – one of the three leading credit rating agencies, along with Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch – to award the tranche its highest rating, Aaa. 
Aaa was a rare distinction. Only a dozen corporations and fewer than two dozen governments 
were judged worthy of it: neither Italy nor Japan has an Aaa rating. (Standard & Poor’s 
recently indicated that the UK is now in some danger of losing its top rating.) Blythe Masters 
had formidable powers of persuasion, which helped when selling a deal that looked ‘like a 
science experiment, with all those arrows’, as one investor quoted by Tett described Bistro’s 
documentation. Yet 60 basis points over Libor, for an investment judged safer than the 
sovereign bonds of some of the world’s leading economies, was the most powerful argument 
of all: an investor would normally struggle to find an Aaa investment that yielded as much as 
Libor. 
For J.P. Morgan, Bistro solved one problem and potentially addressed a second. First, while 
the 307 corporations were generally low risks, even the most creditworthy borrowers can 
default. So $9.7 billion in loans was a significant constraint on the bank’s future lending. 
Bistro removed that constraint. Second, the Basel Capital Accord, signed by the world’s 
leading banking regulators in 1988 and implemented by them in 1992, forced banks to carry 
reserves equal to 8 per cent of their risk-weighted lending. While certain categories of 
lending – to other OECD banks, for example – qualified for a reduced reserve requirement, 
loans to even the safest industrial corporation incurred the full 8 per cent, a figure that 
bankers felt was far larger than justified by the risks involved. J.P. Morgan hoped that the 
transfer of credit risk achieved by Bistro would persuade regulators to reduce that 
requirement considerably, and Tett reports that Masters and her colleague Bill Demchak 
pushed the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to clarify what 
exactly would be needed to achieve that. 
Bistro differed from earlier CDOs in that it did not, in fact, transfer to external investors all 
the credit risk of the $9.7 billion of loans. The junior and senior tranches amounted in total to 
only $700 million; the bank believed that the chances of losses ever exceeding that figure 
were too tiny for it to be worth paying investors to shoulder them. The regulators, however, 
demanded that the bank do something to remove that residual ‘unfunded risk’ before they 
would relax the 8 per cent capital requirement. 
The residual risk was like a topmost tranche, sitting above the senior tranche; it would come 
into play only if losses entirely wiped out the latter. The senior tranche was Aaa, as safe as it 
gets; the residual ‘super-senior’ tranche (as the J.P. Morgan team christened it) was safer than 
safe. To satisfy the regulators, however, the team turned to the Financial Products division of 
the leading US insurer, AIG. Sharing J.P. Morgan’s analysis that the super-senior tranche was 
ultrasafe, AIG agreed to insure it against all remaining losses, charging an annual premium of 
only a fiftieth of 1 per cent of the sum insured. From the viewpoint of AIG, it was small-scale 
business, but apparently highly profitable: by covering an effectively non-existent risk, the 
firm earned $1.8 million a year. 
In that little afterthought to Bistro – what to do with the super-senior tranche – lay the germ 
of much of the credit crisis, especially its disastrous effects on many of the world’s leading 
banks. Bistro-like deals started in the world of corporate borrowing, but from 1999 began 
also to be implemented in the world of consumer debt, especially mortgages. Lenders 
actually had a longer experience of packaging mortgages into securities than of packaging 
corporate debt into CDOs, and mortgage-backed securities had acquired an admirable 
reputation for safety. They have a structure like that of CDOs, with different tranches 
carrying various levels of exposure to risk. The safest, Aaa tranches had impeccably default-
free records, and even the riskier tranches had performed well: indeed, on average better than 
corporate bonds with the same ratings. It wasn’t that people never defaulted on their 
mortgages – they did – but the securities were designed to take this into account, for example 
by building up reserve funds (analogous to but usually proportionally larger than Bistro’s 
small reserve) that would absorb the anticipated losses. For many years, such provisions 
proved in general fully adequate. 
What happened from 1999 onwards was that mortgage-backed securities, which already 
represented one layer of packaging of debt, started to be repackaged into CDOs, thus creating 
a Russian doll product: a tranched, packaged product each component of which was itself a 
tranche of a packaged product. Given their excellent reputation, putting mortgage-backed 
securities rather than corporate bonds or loans inside CDOs might seem a small step. Yet 
when in 1999 Bayerische Landesbank, which had become involved in the US mortgage 
market, approached J.P. Morgan to package $14 billion of bundles of mortgages and other 
forms of predominantly consumer debt into a Bistro structure, there were initially serious 
doubts within the Morgan team. 
The problematic issue was correlation, which is at the core of evaluating a CDO. Low 
correlation means that defaults are essentially idiosyncratic events, with the consequence that 
only the bottommost tranche of a typical CDO is at significant risk. High correlation means 
that if defaults happen they tend to cluster, and the clustering of defaults puts investors in the 
higher, apparently safer, tranches at risk of loss. Participants in the emerging credit-
derivatives market tended to be confident that they had a fair grasp of the correlation of 
corporate defaults. The rating agencies had large databases of such defaults from which the 
extent of clustering could be inferred at least roughly, and other market participants often 
took the easily measured level of correlation between the moves of different corporations’ 
stock prices as a guide to the correlation of their net asset values. (The link between the latter 
and default is that the most important cause of corporate default is bankruptcy, which can be 
thought of as happening when a corporation’s net asset value falls below zero: that is, when 
its liabilities exceed its assets.) Clearly, the correlation of the asset values of two different 
corporations was unlikely to be zero, since general economic conditions will affect both; it 
wasn’t likely to be 1.0 either, since that would indicate perfect correlation. A commonly used 
figure was 0.3: it was, for example, the standard level of correlation between the asset values 
of firms in the same industry that Standard & Poor’s initially assumed in CDO Evaluator, the 
software system it began using in 2001 to rate CDOs. 
The credit crisis has inured us to gigantic numbers – losses measured in billions or trillions of 
dollars – but we need to pay attention to its small numbers as well if we’re going to 
understand it properly. A correlation of 0.3 was modest. If it was correct it was highly 
unlikely that the senior tranche of a CDO such as Bistro would suffer a loss – unlikely 
enough to warrant an Aaa rating – and effectively inconceivable that the super-senior tranche 
would be hit. 
However, the figure of 0.3 was produced by analysis of corporate debt. How could one 
estimate the equivalent correlation for mortgage-backed securities? Paradoxically, their safety 
was a disadvantage in this respect: there was effectively no record of default that could be 
scrutinised for traces of clustering. Nor did such securities trade often enough for the 
correlation of their prices to be measured: most investors simply held them until they 
matured. Intuitively, though, it seemed conceivable that defaults in bundles of mortgages or 
other forms of consumer debt could be quite highly correlated, because of the likely influence 
of factors such as the overall unemployment level, and that could make a CDO based on 
mortgage-backed securities an unduly risky product. 
Terri Duhon, who led the Bayerische Landesbank mortgage-backed CDO, told me in an 
interview that some of her J.P. Morgan colleagues doubted at first that the deal should go 
ahead: they argued that ‘there is no way we should be doing this because it’s way too 
correlated.’ Tett reports that Krishna Varikooty, for example, was concerned by a correlation 
risk that seemed to him to be unquantifiable. After intensive discussion and analysis, and very 
conservative structuring of the deal, the team eventually agreed that it was safe to go ahead (it 
helped that, unlike in many more recent deals, the ratings of the underlying assets were high – 
around 95 per cent had Aaa ratings – and none of the securities was based on sub-prime 
mortgages). Yet the reservations remained, and from this point onwards, J.P. Morgan 
constructed only one further large CDO, and a limited number of smaller ones, in which the 
underlying assets were bundles of mortgages. 
Consequently, the bank remained on the sidelines as the once largely distinct worlds of CDOs 
and mortgage-backed securities became more closely linked from 2002 onwards. It was an 
encounter of two subtly different cultures, with, for example, quite different mathematical 
approaches. The CDO world developed explicit and increasingly elaborate models of 
correlation – the ‘Gaussian copula’ that initially puzzled Tett is one of them – while the 
mortgage world handled the phenomenon entirely implicitly. In most investment banks, and 
also – as far as I have been able to discover – in the New York head offices of the rating 
agencies, separate groups or departments handled mortgage-backed securities and CDOs 
based on corporate debt. In investment banks, for instance, those different departments seem 
to have had surprisingly little to do with each other. The two cultures never really merged; 
instead, the CDO, a structure invented by the corporate-debt world, was applied to the 
products of the mortgage world. 
Members of both cultures now see the encounter as corrupting. ‘They’ – constructors of 
CDOs based on mortgage-backed securities – ‘took our tools’ and misused them, one 
specialist in corporate credit derivatives told me a few weeks ago. Those with a background 
in mortgage-backed securities blame CDOs (with some justice) for being indiscriminate 
buyers of those securities, concerned only with their ratings and the spreads (increments over 
Libor) they offered. Two experienced industry observers, Mark Adelson and David Jacob, 
suggest that a fatal point was reached when CDOs became almost the only purchasers of the 
riskier tranches of mortgage-backed securities. Previously, those tranches had either been 
guaranteed against default by specialist insurers, or bought by canny investors, who would 
carefully assess the risks involved. These insurers and investors acted as a brake on the 
riskiness of the lower tranches, and thus on the overall riskiness of mortgage-backed 
securities, and they demanded a healthy rate of return for taking on the risks. They were 
displaced by those buying tranches in order to package them into CDOs, who were prepared 
to buy them at lower rates of return, and who cared a lot less about their riskiness, because 
those risks were going to be passed on to investors in the CDOs. 
With the brake removed, the construction of CDOs based on mortgage-backed securities 
became a fast-moving assembly line (participants frequently turn to machine metaphors when 
describing the process). Brokers sold mortgages knowing that they could readily be sold on in 
the form of mortgage-backed securities. Instead of having to worry whether the couple sitting 
on the other side of their desk really had the wherewithal to keep up their payments, all that 
mattered were the dozen or so quantitative characteristics – such as borrowers’ FICO (Fair 
Isaac Corporation) creditworthiness scores – that influenced rating agencies’ mortgage 
models. The constructors of mortgage-backed securities no longer had to satisfy specialist 
insurers or experienced investors: CDOs had an apparently insatiable demand for those 
securities. 
If the assembly line was to keep moving, it was essential that the higher tranches of its final 
products – CDOs in which the underlying assets were mortgage-backed securities – gained 
Aaa ratings. A critical issue was the likely correlation of mortgage-backed securities. 
Standard & Poor’s, for example, used the same system, CDO Evaluator, that it employed for 
CDOs based on corporate debt, and it used the same modest baseline correlation assumption, 
0.3, for mortgage-backed securities that it initially used for corporations within the same 
industry. (S&P would later reduce this last figure, while increasing its assumption about 
cross-industry correlation.) These baseline correlation figures could be increased by the 
analysts rating a specific CDO if it was highly concentrated in a particular industry or 
consumer debt sector. I haven’t been able to ascertain the equivalent figures used by the other 
agencies, whose methods differed somewhat from Standard & Poor’s, but the similarity of 
their ratings to S&P’s suggest similar judgments. I am focusing on S&P simply because – 
commendably – it seems to have been more explicit than the other agencies, in the publicly 
available documentation for CDO Evaluator, about the crucial assumptions underpinning the 
system. 
The choice of 0.3, or a number close to it, as the baseline was critical: one specialist told me 
that even a moderate increase in the baseline correlation assumption, to 0.5 for example, 
would have made many CDOs based on mortgage-backed securities much less attractive, 
perhaps even not economically viable. However, as far as I can discover, analysing CDOs 
built out of mortgage-backed securities using only modest correlation levels seems in general 
to have been uncontroversial. Certainly, the performance of mortgage-backed securities 
offered little reason to be more stringent when rating CDOs based on them. For example, 
S&P’s statistical analyses suggested a correlation of mortgage-backed securities lower than 
0.3; this figure was retained as a baseline because it was understood that the correlation 
would rise when economic conditions became less benign. 
Had the world remained as it was in 2002, the agencies’ assumptions and ratings might well 
have turned out to be perfectly appropriate. The trouble with an assembly line, though, is that 
it produces identical products. The only person outside J.P. Morgan I’ve found so far who 
thought at the time that the correlation estimates being used to analyse CDOs of mortgage-
backed securities were much too low had made the discovery by accident. In a previous job 
as an auditor, he had checked the statistical tables that the sellers of mortgage-backed 
securities provide to prospective buyers. These tables show the breakdown of the underlying 
loans by state, FICO score, loan-to-value ratio and so on. When checking the tables for one 
security, he inadvertently used the loan tape (the underlying mortgage data) for another, and 
found that they were in almost complete agreement. ‘These deals’ – apparently different 
mortgage-backed securities – ‘were the same deal,’ he told me. Even geographical dispersion 
of the underlying mortgages across the US (a desirable feature when an individual mortgage-
backed security was considered in isolation, because it reduced exposure to the vagaries of a 
particular local housing market) had the paradoxical effect of increasing the homogeneity of 
different mortgage-backed securities. In a situation of severe economic stress – falling house 
prices, rising unemployment – it wasn’t just that some of those securities would perform 
badly; they all would. Instead of correlation remaining modest, my interviewee came to fear 
that it would be close to perfect. 
Specialists in mortgage-backed securities in the US have not been entirely surprised at the 
fraud and malpractice that has come to light: it was always present, and has changed only in 
scale. (There was a US sub-prime crisis in the late 1990s, which only specialists seem to 
remember.[†] It was much more limited in scale, but it revealed extensive over-optimistic 
accounting by lenders.) That mortgage defaults have risen, and the value of repossessed 
homes fallen, is not in itself surprising to specialists, although the size of the changes 
certainly is. At least some of them began to suspect that long-standing statistical relationships 
– for example between individuals’ credit scores and the risk that they would default on their 
mortgages – had ceased to be valid, but as far as I can tell this didn’t happen until as late as 
2006, by which time the processes that led to the credit crisis were well underway. One 
problem, for instance, seems to have been that as individuals’ scores increasingly determined 
their access to credit and the rates of interest they had to pay, they found ways to manipulate 
those scores. A modest web-based industry developed which arranged (in return for a fee of 
one or two thousand dollars per person) for people – in some cases, apparently, dozens of 
people – with low credit scores to be added as ‘authorised users’ to the credit card account of 
someone with a high score and an impeccable payment record. It took just a month or two for 
the benefits of the primary cardholder’s regular payments to feed through into improvements 
in the credit scores of the card’s ‘renters’. 
If CDOs backed by mortgages had worked as the J.P. Morgan team had envisaged when 
designing Bistro, the losses to investors in those CDOs that the US housing bubble and its 
collapse have caused, though very large, would have been spread widely across the many 
institutions that bought tranches of such CDOs. As Tett notes, what has shocked the members 
of that team – many of whom now work for other banks and hedge funds, but still stay in 
touch – is the concentration of such losses, especially at apparently sophisticated global banks 
such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
The primary vehicle by which risk was concentrated was Bistro’s afterthought, the super-
senior tranches of CDOs. Even the riskiest mortgage-backed CDOs – those that 
predominantly bought ‘mezzanine’ (next-to-lowest) tranches of mortgage-backed securities – 
have super-senior tranches that are bigger than all the other tranches put together. These 
super-senior tranches were hard to sell to most outside investors, because the need for 
attractive returns on lower tranches means a super-senior tranche can offer only a slender 
increment over Libor. By 2005, Tett reports, that spread was as low as 15 basis points. 
Thus many banks did as J.P. Morgan did with Bistro: they kept the super-senior tranches, 
sometimes insuring them via AIG or specialist bond insurers. (Adelson and Jacob point out 
the irony: risks that mortgage experts in the insurers would have charged heavily for or 
perhaps even declined were insured in packaged form in huge amounts – and quite cheaply – 
by different departments of the same firms.) If only a handful of deals had been insured in 
this way, it would have made perfect sense. As Tett observes, however, AIG insured super-
senior tranches amounting to $560 billion. Its bail-out by the US taxpayer dwarfs that of any 
bank, and it keeps rising (the current total is $173 billion). But AIG cannot be allowed to fail, 
because the loss of these crucial super-senior insurance contracts could bring much of the 
banking system down with it. 
Perhaps most surprising of all, top banks also bought super-senior tranches originated by 
other banks. If you are a top bank, you can borrow at around Libor (that is, after all, what 
Libor means); if you are particularly well regarded, it may be possible to borrow at a rate a 
tiny bit lower than Libor. So you could borrow at Libor or below, buy a tranche that seemed 
safer than safe, and from it earn a slender spread over Libor. It looked like free money. It was 
especially tempting to traders whose banks ‘charged’ them for their use of capital, in the 
systems by which traders’ profit is measured, at around Libor, and credited them with the 
small additional spread that super-senior tranches offered. The slenderness of the spread 
meant that you had to do the trade on a very large scale to earn a really big bonus, so traders 
did just that. 
As I’ve already indicated, the vulnerability of super-senior tranches is correlation. Losses on 
uncorrelated assets are unlikely ever to impact on super-senior tranches. When correlation 
approaches 1.0, however, a CDO’s asset pool starts to behave like a single investment. It may 
suffer no defaults, or it may default effectively in its entirety. If the latter happens, even the 
super-senior tranche, safer than safe, is doomed. 
As the historian of economics Perry Mehrling has pointed out, events in financial markets 
cast shadows ahead, not behind. What has loomed over the banking system for the last two 
years is the shadow of the gigantic, system-wide default of the super-senior tranches of all the 
CDOs based on the US mortgage-backed securities issued towards the end of the bubble. 
(Residential mortgages have been the focus of most of the attention, but there are also lots of 
problems with commercial mortgages.) Although, alas, the losses will not stop there, most 
immediately at risk have been CDOs made up primarily of the mezzanine tranches of sub-
prime mortgage-backed securities issued from late 2005 on. Defaults have risen enough, the 
value of repossessed homes has fallen enough, and the structure and composition of these 
securities has been similar enough, that as far as I can tell almost all such tranches have been 
or will be completely wiped out. If a CDO contains little but such tranches, even its super-
senior portion faces close to total losses. So far, only a limited portion of those losses have 
actually been realised. The banking system is braced for the rest of them but, with the 
massive aid of taxpayers, it is, one hopes, now well enough capitalised to survive these and 
the other losses that sharp recession will bring. 
Unfortunately, this analysis – that the crux of the problem has been not in CDOs per se but in 
the uncomfortable encounter between the world of CDOs and that of mortgage-backed 
securities – remains only a hypothesis. The world of corporate CDOs has itself manifested 
some of the phenomena of the mortgage CDO assembly line: increasingly risky loans were 
made to private equity firms and to other highly indebted corporate borrowers because it was 
possible to package and sell on those loans in the form of CDOs. I’ve just come back from 
New York, where I asked some of those I spoke to about the magnitude of the problems that 
may lurk beneath the still comparatively quiet surface of this sector of the CDO market, 
which, although not as large as the mortgage sector, is still huge. My interviewees seem 
convinced that while the problems are real, they are on nothing like the same scale: the 
amount of truly irresponsible lending to corporations was much smaller. I hope they are right. 
At its heart, Tett’s tale is a moral one. She believes that the history of the J.P. Morgan credit 
derivatives team shows that banking can be technically innovative while remaining 
responsible. Her readers may fear that the anthropologist has gone native, but I don’t think so. 
I have met a good number of the people she is writing about, and have studied many of the 
same events, and I largely share her judgment. In particular, J.P. Morgan’s decision not to set 
up a mortgage CDO assembly line has saved the bank from the catastrophic losses so many 
of its peers have suffered; unlike theirs, its solvency has never been in doubt. It is too easy 
just now to condemn all of those who work at the heart of the financial system as either 
rogues or fools. Tett is right to emphasise that despite all the pressures and all the 
temptations, prudent banking was still practised – sometimes – even at the centre of history’s 
largest ever credit bubble. 
11 June 
[*] Donald MacKenzie wrote about CDOs in the LRB of 8 May 2008 and about Libor in the 
issue of 25 September 2008. 
[†] It is discussed in the final chapter of an excellent book that, while more limited in scope 
and more technical than Tett’s, deserves to be better known: Subprime Mortgage Credit 
Derivatives by Laurie Goodman et al (Wiley, 344 pp., £55, July 2008, 978 0 470 24366 4). 
Vol. 31 No. 12 · 25 June 2009 » Donald MacKenzie » All Those Arrows 
pages 20-22 | 4753 words 
 
